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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : Case No. 20020056-CA 
STEPHEN C. HENLINE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (Supp. 2002), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Utah, the Honorable David S. Young 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Where defense counsel stipulated to the admission of defendant's 
Breathalyzer test results, (A) did the trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte 
excluding the stipulation, and (B) was defense counsel ineffective for not objecting to the 
admission of the test results? 
1 
Standards of Review: (A) To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate 
that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
(B) Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal are reviewed as a 
matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are included at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002); 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol, 
a third degree felony, and improper lane travel, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-2. The case 
was tried before a jury. R. 22-23,68. The jury convicted defendant on Count I. R. 53. 
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory indeterminate prison term of zero to five years. 
R. 55-56. Defendant timely appeals his conviction. R. 57. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
At approximately 6:00 a.m. on June 21,2001, Officer Elwyn Slagowski received a 
call from dispatch informing him that a car had slid off Interstate 80 outside Wendover. 
R. 68:9-10. Twenty minutes later, at about eighteen miles from the Nevada-Utah state 
'The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
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line, Officer Slagowski saw a car stuck in the mud, three-fourths of the way across the 
median. R. 68:11,26,28. Officer Slagowski discerned that the car was heading 
eastbound because there were continuous skid marks where the car had slid off the road. 
R. 68:12. As he approached the car, the officer could tell from the footprints in the soft 
mud that the driver had exited the car, walked to the back of the car and then around to 
the passenger side, and re-entered the car on the passenger side. R. 68:13, 30. 
The officer also observed that defendant was reclined and asleep in the passenger 
seat R. 68:14, 30. As Officer Slagowski awakened defendant, he smelled alcohol and 
noticed that defendant had red, watery eyes. R. 68:15. When asked if he had been 
drinking, defendant admitted that he was drinking Southern Comfort, but quickly 
qualified his statement by saying, "my sister was driving, I wasn't." R. 68:17. Officer 
Slagowski then administered a field sobriety test, which defendant failed. R. 68:17-20. 
The fact that defendant failed his field sobriety test was stipulated to at trial. R. 68:20. 
Officer Slagowski then placed defendant under arrest, read him his Miranda 
warnings, and questioned him. R. 68:21. Defendant told the officer that he drank beer 
and three to four shots of Southern Comfort at the casino and had his last drink at about 
4:30 in the morning. R. 68:22,30. Defendant also said he had not had any alcohol since 
"the crash." R. 68:29. Officer Slagowski searched defendant's car, including the trunk, 
underneath the seats, and the surrounding highway, but found no alcoholic beverage 
containers. R. 68:16, 26-28. 
\ 3 
At 8:43 a.m., approximately two hours and twenty minutes after Officer Slagowksi 
first arrived at the accident scene, the officer took defendant to the police station and 
administered a blood-alcohol test. R. 68:23. Defendant's blood-alcohol level was .173 
percent, more than double Utah's legal limit. Id. The results of defendant's Breathalyzer 
test were stipulated to at trial. Id. 
At trial, defendant claimed that he drove to Wendover from Salt Lake City at about 
9:30 p.m. to test drive the new car he had recently repaired. R. 68:33,42. When he 
arrived in Wendover, he gambled at several casinos and decided to drive back to Salt 
Lake City at approximately 2:30 in the morning. R. 68:33. While on his way home, 
defendant said he became sleepy and decided to make a U-turn and head back to 
Wendover to get a hotel room for the night. R. 68:34. Unfortunately, his car got stuck in 
the mud on the median. R. 68:35. 
Upset because he had recently purchased the car, defendant said he walked around 
the car to the trunk, removed half a bottle full of vodka from the trunk, walked over to the 
passenger side, and drank the bottle. R. 68:35-36,46. When he finished the bottle of 
vodka, he "opened the door, stepped out and gave it a good chuck across the highway." 
R. 68:37,48. Although unsure, defendant said he probably heard the bottle "clink" as it 
landed, but that he was "pretty drunk at that time" and "wasn't really worried about what 
was going on around [him.]" R. 68:37. He then tilted the seat back and went to sleep, 
only to be awaken by Officer Slagowski at about 6:30 a.m. R. 68:38,40. 
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Defendant testified that he told Officer Slagowski that he had consumed two beers 
and several shots of Southern Comfort at the casinos, but that he did not mention the 
bottle of vodka. R. 68:40-42,44-45. He also told the officer that his sister was driving 
the car and that she got mad when the car became stuck and found a ride back to 
Wendover. R. 68:38. However, defendant admitted at trial that this story was a lie. R. 
68:38-39. Defendant only mentioned his sister because he was afraid that if he admitted 
to drinking in his car, his commercial driver's license would be revoked. R. 68:39,43, 
48. He also confessed that he did not mention the bottle of vodka because he knew "[i]t's 
illegal to have alcohol in your car." R. 68:44-45. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte excluding 
evidence of defendant's Breathalyzer test results for lack of foundation. Alternatively, 
defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission 
of the test results. However, defendant's claims ignore the fact that defense counsel 
stipulated to the admission of the test results. 
Where defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the test results for strategic 
reasons, defendant cannot show that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte 
interceding. Any interference by the trial court in defense counsel's strategy could have 
been harmful to defendant's case. Thus, the trial court appropriately honored the defense 
counsel's stipulation. Moreover, the invited error doctrine precludes defendant's plain 
error claim. Given the fact that defendant stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer 
5 
test results, he cannot now claim that the trial court plainly erred in receiving his 
stipulation. 
In light of defense counsel's stipulation to the admission of the Breathalyzer test 
results, defendant must prove that the stipulation was unreasonable to show that his 
counsel was ineffective. Defendant fails to make such a showing. The record indicates 
that defense counsel's decision to stipulate to the admission of the Breathalyzer test 
results was reasonable. Thus, because defendant cannot show that his counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, his 
claim fails. 
ARGUMENT 
POBVTI 
WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL STIPULATED TO THE 
ADMISSION OF DEFENDANT'S BREATHALYZER 
TEST RESULTS, DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY 
NOT SUA SPONTE EXCLUDING THE TEST 
RESULTS, AND THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT OBJECTING TO THEIR 
ADMISSION 
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred when it allowed defendant's 
Breathalyzer test results into evidence at trial without sua sponte requiring the State to 
establish the reliability of those tests. Br. of Aplt. at 6-7, 9-10. Alternatively, he claims 
that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of test results at trial. 
Id. at 7-9. Defendant's claims lack merit. 
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A. Where defendant stipulated to the admission of his Breathalyzer test 
results, his claim that the trial court plainly erred by not sua sponte 
excluding the test results fails. 
To establish that the trial court plainly erred in accepting the Breathalyzer test 
results into evidence, defendant must demonstrate that "(0 taln error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). Defendant's plain error claim fails because his counsel 
reasonably stipulated to the admission of the test results. 
Defendant asserts that there was no stipulation to the Breathalyzer test results. See 
Br. of Apit. at 6-9. However, the record refutes that assertion. Although a written 
stipulation is not in the record, the trial transcript establishes that defense counsel did 
stipulate to admission of the Breathalyzer test results. During opening statements the 
prosecutor explained to the jury that the parties had stipulated to the test results. 
There's no issue that [defendant] was drinking. We'll stipulate that and 
counsel will stipulate that [defendant] blew in the [Breathalyzer] which is 
what measures your breath alcohol or your blood alcohol, he blew over .17 
which is twice the legal limit. We'll have to stipulate and we will stipulate 
that this took place, the [Breathalyzer] took place almost three hours, in 
fact, two and a half hours after the [S]argent first makes contact with 
[defendant]. 
R. 68:3. Accordingly, at some point before trial the prosecutor agreed to stipulate that 
the test took place two-and-a-half hours after the officer first encountered defendant 
asleep in his car, and defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the admission of the 
Breathalyzer test results. See id. 
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The reason for this stipulation becomes clearer during defense counsel's opening 
remarks. Addressing whether defendant had control of the vehicle, defense counsel 
argued: 
Our point on that is, just so you know up front, at 6:30 in the morning or 
whenever it was that Officer Slagowski stopped [defendant], we'll tell you 
and admit right up front,[defendant] was too drunk to drive at 6:30 in the 
morning, okay? But the point is so you understand what we're arguing 
about, is at 6:30 in the morning [defendant] was not in actual physical 
control of the motor vehicle, okay? 
[W]hen the car was driven into the mud, okay, was the defendant in actual 
physical control of the vehicle? Yes. And at the time he drove the car into 
the mud was he drunk? Had he consumed so much alcohol he was unable 
to safely operate the vehicle? The point is, at that time, no, okay? Does 
that make sense. Time wise we're talking about two different time periods. 
[Defendant] is saying he's basically sitting out in that mud and he'll testify 
today, approximately four hours, okay. He did not consume the alcohol 
basically until after he was stuck in the mud trying to turn his vehicle 
around and go back to Wendover, okay? So you need to keep the time 
periods separate. That's an important thing to keep in mind about what 
time periods we're talking about, okay? And I think that's important for 
you to talk about today and to pay attention to. 
Also, I think [the prosecutor] hit this point as well, but just to make sure 
you understand, [the prosecutor] talked about the blood alcohol test, 
okay—and you'll get into a jury instruction on this but basically it says if 
you're over .08, you're deemed basically unable to drive a vehicle. It's 
illegal to drive a vehicle when your blood alcohol is at .08. However, that 
test is only admissible when it's taken within two hours of the actual 
driving, okay? Anytime after that, it's up to you to decide what to do with 
it. 
R. 68:6-7. Defense counsel's remarks clearly indicate that the Breathalyzer test results 
were undisputed. See id. Instead, defense counsel was disputing the overall weight of a 
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Breathalyzer test taken over two hours after the officer first encountered defendant who 
had allegedly already yielded control of the vehicle. See id. 
Further evidence of the stipulation surfaced as the prosecutor questioned Officer 
Slagowski. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked the officer a series of 
questions regarding the nature of field sobriety tests. See R. 68:17-20. At that point, 
defense counsel interrupted the questioning and the following colloquy occurred. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I guess I'm questioning how relevant this is. 
We've already pretty much stipulated the fact 
that my client failed the field sobriety test. For 
the sake of time, do we need to keep going over 
them all? 
[PROSECUTOR]: If we stipulate up to the (inaudible) of it then the 
only issue whey we were bringing it up, Your 
Honor, is that this came approximately 6:30 in 
the morning where the breath alcohol wasn't 
take [sic] until some time later. That's the only 
reason. If [defense counsel] stipulates to it— 
THE COURT: All right. [Defense counsel] stipulates. You've 
had a stipulation and you may consider it as 
established so the State has established by the 
agreement of the parties that [defendant] failed 
the field sobriety tests. 
R. 68:20. Then, the prosecutor conducted the following inquiry without objection from 
defense counsel. 
[PROSECUTOR] Trooper, did you subsequently then have 
[defendant] perform a test, a breath alcohol test? 
[OFFICER] Yes. 
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[PROSECUTOR] 
[OFFICER] 
[PROSECUTOR] 
[OFFICER] 
[PROSECUTOR] 
[OFFICER] 
[PROSECUTOR] 
[OFFICER] 
And I believe it was stipulated too. What 
results did you receive off of that? 
The results from his breath test was a .173 
percent at 8:43 in the morning. 
So .173. What is the legal limit in the State of 
Utah? 
.08. 
.08. So this is double. However, this 
comes—you get to the scene between 6:10 and 
6:20. This comes at 8:43? 
Correct. 
So it's about two hours and 20 minutes 
approximately after you first arrived at the 
scene? 
From when I first arrived at the scene. 
R. 68:23. 
The parties' stipulation was also memorialized in Instruction No. 7, which was 
read to the jury following the presentation of evidence. 
The results of the chemical test would be admissible as evidence of a 
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating or 
actual physical control. But you as the trier of fact, shall determine what 
weight is to be given to the result: of the test. 
R. 68:53. 
As indicated by defense counsel's remarks, defense counsel stipulated to the 
Breathalyzer test results for strategic reasons. Counsel argued that defendant only began 
drinking after his vehicle got stuck in the mud and he no longer was in control of the 
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vehicle. See R. 68:6-7. Thus, defense counsel sought to downplay the Breathalyzer test 
results which were taken hours after defendant began drinking. See id. 
Given that strategy, it necessarily follows that a trial court's sua sponte 
intercession requiring that the State establish the foundation for the Breathalyzer test 
results could have adversely interfered with trial counsel's legitimate strategy. For that 
reason, a trial court is "'not required to constantly survey or second-guess the 
nonobjecting party's best interests or trial strategy.'" State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 
(Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937,939 (Utah 1996). Therefore, 
because defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer test results, 
defendant cannot show that there was an obvious error that the trial court should have sua 
sponte rectified. See Dunn, 850P.2dat 1208.2 
Invited error. In any event, the invited error doctrine deprives defendant of his 
plain error claim. "The 'invited error' doctrine 'prohibits a party from setting up an error 
at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah 
App. 1998) ajfd, 1999 UT 79,985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201,1205 
(Utah App. 1991) (additional quotations omitted)). "[Appellate courts] have refused to 
give defendants the benefit of traditional plain error analysis where doing so would create 
2Additionally, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the admission of 
the Breathalyzer test results. Even without the test results, defendant's admission that he 
had several drinks before leaving the casinos, the skids marks of his tires indicating that 
he lost control of his vehicle before getting stuck in the mud, and the fact that he failed 
the field sobriety tests were enough to convict defendant of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002). 
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an incentive for invited error." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (citing 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)). Accordingly, where a stipulation is 
offered, "[a defendant is precluded from arguing on appeal that it was plain error for the 
trial court to [receive] it." State v. Tueller, 2001 UT App 317, f 21, 37 P.3d 1180 (citing 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31); Layman, 953 P.2d at 785. 
Given defense counsel's stipulation to the admission of the Breathalyzer test 
results, defendant is precluded from arguing on appeal that it was plain error for the trial 
court to accept the test results into evidence. See id at 785-86. Therefore, because 
defendant attempted to '"set[] up an error at trialf,] and [is now] complaining of it on 
appealf,]'" his claim fails. Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 (citation omitted). 
B. Defense counsel decision not to object to the admission of the 
Breathalyzer test results did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Alternatively, defendant argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for not objecting to the admission of the Breathalyzer test results. Br. of Aplt. 
at 7-9. Specifically, defendant argues (1) that trial counsel rendered deficient 
performance by "allowing] the [S]tate to put on a more credible case than it otherwise 
would have been able to do(,]" and (2) that defendant was prejudiced because without 
foundational evidence to support the Breathalyzer test results, the test results would have 
been inadmissible, and therefore "the jury would have never known [sic] how drunk 
[defendant] really was." Id. at 8-9. However, defendant's claims ignore the fact that 
counsel stipulated to the admission of the test results. 
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"With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must first demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment[,]" and "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the 
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy."" State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 19,12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-89 (1984) and Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101 (1955)). "Second, the 
defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it 
affected the outcome of the case." Id. 
Given the fact that defense counsel stipulated to the admission of the Breathalyzer 
test results, defendant must demonstrate that the stipulation was unreasonable to show 
that counsel's performance was deficient. See Tueller, 2001 UT App 317,121. 
Defendant has not alleged, much less shown that the stipulation was unreasonable. In 
fact, the record indicates that trial counsel had several legitimate reasons for stipulating to 
the admission of the test results. First, nothing in the record indicates that the 
Breathalyzer test results were inadmissible. See record generally. Certainly, the State 
could have subpoenaed the records custodian to testify as to the test's reliability. Rather 
than waste time and resources by forcing the State to lay the proper foundation for 
admission of the test results, defense counsel chose to stipulate to their admissibility. 
This decision was reasonable. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^  34,989 P.2d 52 ('"the 
failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised does not 
constitute ineffective assistance."') (Citations omitted). 
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Second, the record indicates that defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the 
admission of the Breathalyzer test results in exchange for the prosecutor's stipulation to 
the hour when the test was taken. See R. 68:3. To put forth his theory of the case, 
counsel needed to show that the test results had no bearing on whether defendant was 
inebriated at the time his vehicle left the road. SeeR. 68:6-7. Therefore, it was 
reasonable for defense counsel to offer his stipulation in exchange for needed evidence. 
Third, as shown above, defense counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for not 
requiring the State to establish the reliability of the Breathalyzer test results. Defense 
counsel argued that defendant was sober when his vehicle got stuck in the mud and that 
defendant only began drinking after he was no longer in control of his vehicle. See R. 
68:6-7. The fact that defendant's blood alcohol level was show to be. 173 several hours 
later only supported his story. Accordingly, counsel's decision to stipulate to the test 
results was a strategic move to minimize weight of that evidence. See State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990) ("Whenever there is a 
legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it 
did not produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel."). 
Given the reasonableness of defense counsel's decision to stipulate to the 
admission of the Breathalyzer test results, defense counsel's actions did not fall below an 
"objective standard of reasonable professional judgment/5 See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 
19. Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See State v. Medina-
Juarez, 2001 UT 79,1f 14, 34 P.3d 187 (where a defendant fails to establish either prong 
14 
of the Strickland test, counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and the other 
prong of the test need not be addressed).3 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Dated this / % -^day of October, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JPFREY Ti^ COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
3In the Argument Summary section of his brief, defendant claims that "as the 
motor vehicle was clearly not operable as testified to by the police officer, he could not be 
found guilty of being in actual physical control of an operable motor vehicle while 
intoxicated." Br. of Aplt at 6. That sentence is the singular place this claim appears in 
defendant's brief. See generally Br. of Aplt. No citation or analysis is offered in its 
support. See id. Accordingly, where defendant's claim is inadequately briefed it need not 
be considered by this court. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("[t]he argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, f | 5-6,1 P.3d 1108 ("[an appellate court] is not a depository in which the 
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research") (citation omitted); State 
v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, ^ 11,974 P.2d 269 ("an appellate court will decline to consider an 
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief) (Citation omitted). 
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41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration —Measurement of 
blood or breath alcohol —Criminal punishment —Arrest without warrant — 
Penalties —Suspension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving 
under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance 
that is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (1)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 7 6-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance 
abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local 
ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-
4 3; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of 
Subsection (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a 
third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury 
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol 
level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if 
the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse 
treatment is ar:ropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years 
of two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after 
July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 
1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care or 
inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after 
treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not 
be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation or 
parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this section may not 
be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5)', and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person, to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, 
substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under 
Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails 
to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment 
costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the 
person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and 
(3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to 
a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or 
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered 
under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45, 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation 
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for 
the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed 
within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court 
under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use'of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law 
enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be 
monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a 
substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the 
time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to 
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly 
between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if 
the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by 
the court under Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
mmmmmmmmmmmmm 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive ail or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover 
the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then 
the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
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41-6-44.3 Standards for chemical breath analysis —Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a 
person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the 
instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection 
(1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) 
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
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1 TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH; NOVEMBER 2, 2001 
2 : HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG PRESIDING 
3 • *PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - OPENING STATEMENTS TO CLOSING STATEMENTS' 
4 P R O C E E D I N G S 
5 THE COURT: Good morning. First of all welcome to the 
6 I jurors. This is the time set for trial in the matter of State 
i 
7 | of Utah versus Stephen Kory Henline. The case is 011300264. 
8 i Are the parties present and prepared to proceed? 
i 
9 i MR. BROADHEAD: Yes, Your Honor. Scott Broadhead for 
10 * the defendant. 
11 , MR. SEARLE: Yes, Your Honor. Gary Searle for the . 1 
12 | State. 
13 : (Jury selection and voir dire not transcribed) 
14 THE COURT: The record will show we're reconvened in 
15 ; the presence of the jury and we'll do opening statements. An 
16 | opening statement is just simply an overview. Evidence comes 
17 ; from that to which both sides agree or may be called a 
18 ;• stipulation for from witnesses. Questions of attorneys and 
19 : arguments of attorneys would not be evidence. It gives you 
20 direction. 
21 So your.opening statement please, if you would, Mr. 
22 Searle. 
23 MR. SEARLE: Thank you. Your Honor, counsel, ladies 
24 and gentlemen. I'll make this brief. Thank you for your time 
25 . today. We're going to try, Mr. Broadhead and I have been able 
mmmmm^mm 
to agree on most issues in this trial and we'll present 
obviously the ones that are at issue to you today. It's a case 
involving a DUI, driving under the influence, and it's our 
responsibility today to prove that on June 21st of this year, 
the defendant, Mr. Henline, was driving while under the 
influence of alcohol which rendered him incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
What happened in this matter is there was a call that 
came in to Sargent Slagowski with the Highway Patrol that he 
needed to respond to a car that had gone off the road on 1-80. 
He got in his vehicle. He got out there and it was just jafter* 
six o'clock when he arrived at the scene and noticed the car 
had - there were skid marks on the road. A car had gone off 
the road and after it had gone off the road, then they'd 
attempted to drive through. 
If you go out to Wendover, as the trip will tell you, 
when you're out that far it's pretty much just salt and mud and 
so the car slid off and then it attempted to drive through and 
gotten stuck. Trooper arrives, he looks, there's the car stuck 
down there and one of the first thing he notices is is there 
are footprints around the vehicle. The footprints around the 
vehicle extend only around the vehicle. There are no 
footprints, this is soft mud, there are no footprints that head 
out away from the vehicle in any direction so you'll see that 
we have a videotape and we'll just show the first portion of 
1 that, just the first couple of minutes, showing you where it 
2 is. There's no bushes out there. There's nothing there and 
3 the car is stuck and the prints are around the car. So the 
4 trooper then makes contact with the sole occupant of the car 
5 " and this is important because no one has left the vehicle and 
6 ; there's only one person in the vehicle and the trooper sees 
7 that there are prints that come from the driver's door around 
8 ! and then in the passenger door. Well, he makes contact with 
9 the occupant of the vehicle and he will be identified as Mr. 
10 ! Henline and Mr. Henline is asleep in the back seat of the car. 
11 The keys to the car are on the passenger's rear with him.- .;• -
12 , When the trooper makes contact, he smells alcohol. 
13 ! Mr. Henline is unsteady. There are some indications that he'd 
14
 : been drinking. He has him come up, takes some field sobriety 
15 j tests which determines that he's under the influence of 
16 alcohol. He then begins to question him on that. 
17 So. where really the issue that we're going to present 
18 to you today comes forth. There's no issue that he was 
19 drinking. We/11 stipulate that and counsel will stipulate that 
20 he blew in the intoxilizer which is what measures your breath 
21 ; alcohol or your blood alcohol, he blew over .17 which is twice 
22 the legal limit. We'll have to stipulate and we will stipulate 
23 that this took place, the breathalyser took place almost three 
24 hours, in fact, two and a half hours after the sargent first 
25 makes contact with Mr. Henline. So it's down the road but 
- 3 
1 they're waiting for a wrecker and he's doing the interview. He 
2 can't leave the car there until the wrecker comes so he's at 
3 the mercy of some forces that he doesn't have any control over. 
4 The issue here -is, was he intoxicated while driving? Well, 
5 there's some indications that we will present to you that 
i 
6 • showed, we feel shows, that he was intoxicated while driving. 
7 | One, there's nobody else in the car so he was the driver of the 
8 • car and there's nobody who has left the car. Two, we'll show 
9 ; that there were no alcoholic beverages, cans, bottles in the 
i 
10 | car, nor were there any in the immediate vicinity. The trooper 
11 ! takes his video camera and moves it so that you can see tjhis-: is 
12 ! flat salt and there's no bottles or cans out there- The reason 
13 ; for this is the trooper will tell you, that he has people who 
14 I will say, I'm here and I'm drinking while I'm waiting. 
15 ' He then begins to interview Mr. Henline and Mr. 
16 Henline in the interview says that he was at the State Line and 
17 , he was at the casinos in Wendover, he'd been drinking beer and 
18-; Southern Comfort. He had his last drink at approximately 4:30 
19 there, left the casinos, that's when the trooper then found him 
20 i or was called out at six o'clock. The trooper specifically 
21 i asks him, there is a question that the trooper follows, the 
22 ; State puts out a form of questions that then they follow 
23 question for question as they go down it. One of those 
24 questions is, have you drank since the crash? Now as the 
25 trooper is asking the questions, he's reading it from the form 
1 and then there is a line and he indicates there on chat form 
2 : what the response is, if any. And the response is, uNo, I have 
3 not had any - no, there was nothing to drink since the crash." 
4 And the trooper will tell you that. There's also indications 
5 that he tells the trooper my sister was driving. She got mad, 
6 ! she left. Once again I wasn't driving and there's some 
7 > indications, the evidence will show that Mr. Henline wanted to 
8 pass off on different people. 
9 ; That's really the facts here, to cut it to a chase. 
10 We'll present evidence that shows, or we believe shows that he 
11 ; was drinking before he wrecked the car while driving. The 
12 defense will put at issue that he drank after he was driving. 
13 ' That's the only issue here, was he drinking before or after th 
14 crash and we'11 provide evidence which we believe shows that h 
15 was drinking before he crashed his car and therefore, he^was 
16 under the influence. Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you Mr. Searle. 
18 1 Mr. Broadhead, you may make your opening statement 
19 now or reserve it. 
20 MR. BROADHEAD: I'll do it now Your Honor real 
21 briefly. Mr. Searle hit on a few points and I just want to 
22 kind of narrow down what we're talking about here, okay? I 
23 think there are kind of two, pretty much two basic issues to 
24 deal with, okay? Mr. Searle talked about driving under the 
25 influence so we have the first issue is is at the time that th 
1 Officer approached Mr. Henline, so possibly 6:30 in the 
2 morning, okay? Was Mr. Henline driving a vehicle under the 
3 influence of alcohol, okay? That kind of takes two things 
4 without getting too much into the law. Number one, you have to 
5
 : be in actual physical control of the vehicle, okay? And you 
i 
6 ; have to be in such a condition that it makes you unsafe to 
7
 : operate the vehicle based upon alcohol being in your system, 
8 | Our point on that is, just so you know up front, at 6:30 in the 
morning or whenever it was that Officer Slagowski stopped him, 
10 | we'll tell you and admit right up front, Mr. Henline was too 
i 
11 I drunk to drive at 6:30 in the morning, okay? But the point is : 
12 | so you understand what we're arguing about, is at 6:30 in the 
j 
13 I morning he was not in actual physical control of the motor 
i 
14 ! vehicle, okay? And there will be case law and the jury 
15 i instructions the Judge will present that talks about what the 
16 requirements are to be in actual physical control of the motor 
17 j vehicle. One of those is which the ability to move the vehicle 
| 
18 I and the evidence you'll hear, Officer Slagowski's, I'm sure 
i 
19 he'll admit it, 6:30 in the morning, that car couldn't move. 
20 ! It was stuck in the mud, had to be towed out, it's not going 
21 • anywhere, okay? So at 6:30 in the morning, okay? That's that 
22 I issue. 
23 ' Second issue is then you have to get to well, when 
24 the car was driven into the mud, okay, was the defendant in 
25 actual physical control of the vehicle? Yes. And at the time 
he drove the car into the mud was he drunk? Had he consumed so 
much alcohol he was unable to safely operate the vehicle? The 
point is, at that time, no, okay? Does that make sense. Time 
wise we're talking about two different time periods. Mr. 
Henline is saying he's basically sitting out in that mud and 
he'll testify today, approximately four hours, okay. He did 
not consume the alcohol basically until after he was stuck in 
the mud trying to turn his vehicle around and go back to 
Wendover, okay? So you need to keep the time periods separate. 
That's an important thing to keep in mind about what time 
periods we're talking about, okay? And I think that's Z '-' : 
important for you to talk about today and to pay attention to. 
Also, I think Mr. Searle hit this point as well, but 
just to make sure you understand, Mr. Searle talked about the 
blood alcohol test, okay - and you'll get into jury instruction 
on this but basically it says if you're over .08, you're deemed 
basically unable to drive a vehicle. It's illegal to drive a 
vehicle when your blood alcohol is at .08. However, that test 
is only admissible when it's taken within two hours of the 
actual driving, okay? Anytime after that, it's up to you to 
decide what to do with it. Whether you think it's important 
evidence, unimportant evidence and Mr. Searle, I think, missed 
that last point that it's up to you to decide how much weight 
to give that, okay, because it was taken two, three maybe for 
all we know, five to seven hours after the last time any 
alcohol was consumed. We don't know exactly when, okay? So 
those are two key points. 
Mr. Henline basically will also I'm sure tell you up 
front that at the time he was stopped by Officer Slagowski or 
approached, stop is kind of a legal term. I should say 
approached by Officer Slagowski since his vehicle was already 
stopped, he'll readily admit he said some things to Officer 
Slagowski that were not true. He was scared. He's got an 
officer there. He's trying to think of whatever he can think 
of 'cause he knows he's in trouble, okay? And he'll admit it. 
"I said some things that weren't true" and he'll get up tq; the -
stand today and tell you what they were, okay? And so, r'm 
sure they're going to try to use that against him but you just 
need to understand he's told me already that I said that to the 
officer and it's not true, okay? So you just be aware of that 
because that's going to come out. With that said, we'll close. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Your witness Mr. Searle. 
MR. SEARLE:: Thank you Your Honor. 
Sargent Slagowski. 
THE COURT: Step forward and be sworn please. 
ELWYN SLAGOWSKI 
having been duly sworn testified upon 
his oath as follows: 
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. SEARLE: 
3 Q Name and occupation. 
4 THE COURT: State your name and spell it. 
5 THE WITNESS: Sargent Elwyn L. Slagowski. First name 
6 i is spelled E-L-W-Y-N, last name S-L-A-G-O-W-S-K-I and I'm a 
7 Sargent, District Commander for the Utah Highway Patrol, Tooele 
8 | County, Wendover. 
9 • Q (BY MR. SEARLE) Thank you, Sargent. How long have 
10.i you been a trooper with the Highway Patrol? 
11 A I've been with the Highway Patrol for approximately : 
12 12 years, 
13 Q Twelve years? Here in Utah? Have you had prior law 
14 enforcement experience? 
15
 ; A Yeah. I had approximately 12 years in Wyoming also. 
16 Q And what were you in Wyoming? 
17 • • A I was a police officer, city officer. 
18 < Q Where did you receive your training to be a peace 
19 officer? 
20 A I received training both in Wyoming Police Academy 
21 and Utah Police Academy. 
22 Q Did you successfully complete those academies? 
23 A I did. 
24 MR. BROADHEAD: Your Honor, I'll stipulate to his 
25 qualifications. 
1 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
2 ' MR. BROADHEAD: Let's get through all of this. 
3 Q (BY MR. SEARLE) One thing that I just want to talk 
4 ; briefly about is your qualifications as far as alcohol or 
5 | observance of alcohol. Do you have some unique qualifications 
6 i in observing alcohol or individuals who under the influence of 
7 i alcohol? 
8 | A Yes, I've been trained in the DUI detection at the 
9 (inaudible) and I'm instructor for field sobriety testing 
10 ! techniques for the State of Utah, in fact I'm certified 
i 
11 j throughout the nation and I'm also a drug recognition expert 
12 I instructor and alcohol is, in fact, one of the seven drucr 
I 
13 : categories. 
14 i Q And do you teach at POST? 
15 I A I teach all three POSTs through the State. 
16 I Q All throughout the State. 
17 ; A It's all POST (inaudible). 
1 
18 Q Okay. Thank you, Trooper. Sargent, were you on call 
19 ' or on duty on June 21 of this year? 
i 
20 A I was on call, yes. 
21 j Qf You were on call. Do you recall receiving a call 
22 i from dispatch to go out to a wreck or a car that had slid off 
23 of 1-80? 
24 > A I did. I received a call approximately six o'clock, 
25 ten minutes to six, somewhere in that particular area. I was 
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1 told there had heen a report of a slide off vehicle on 1-80 
2 ; (inaudible) respond, 
3 Q And did you respond to that scene? 
4 A I did. 
5 Q Do you recall approximately how long it took you to 
6 • get to that scene? 
7 , A That distance, it- would be 20 minutes maybe. 
8 ' Q Would it be fair to say then you arrived sometime 
9 ; 6:10 to 6:20? 
10 A Yeah, that's about right, yes. 
11 Q What did you first observe when you came upon tSat * 
12 scene? 
13 : A When I first come upon the scene, I could see where -
14 I was traveling eastbound and I could see where a vehicle had 
15 actually skidded off the side of the road and traveled into the 
16 '• median and made it about three quarters of the way across the 
17 median and then became stuck in the mud. 
18 Q Will you describe the vehicle? 
19 A Just a minute here. It's a 1990 Buick four-door, 
20 license plate 890 Yankee Sierra Alpha, YSA Utah plate. 
21 Q Approximately what mile marker is this on 1-80? 
22 A This was at mile marker 18. 
23 Q Is that 18 miles from Wendover? 
24 A Yes. It would be 18 miles from the state line. 
25 Q And you were eastbound? 
A I was. The subject actually left the road going 
eastbound but when I come around and actually made contact with 
the vehicle and the subject I was then facing westbound. 
Q What indications did you receive from your observance 
at the scene that the vehicle had originally been going 
eastbound? 
A I could actually see skid marks where the vehicle had 
slid off the road. 
Q Were those skid marks continuous then to where the 
vehicle was? 
A It was, 'j / 
Q The vehicle obviously has left the road and passed 
through some dirt of that type of thing. Was that a 
continuation from those ski marks? 
A Yes. From the ski marks into where the vehicle 
actually was stuck was continuous tracks. 
Q You made your observations of the vehicle and the 
skid marks. What other observations did you make concerning 
the scene? 
A When.I first arove (sic) at the scene, I could tell 
that the vehicle was, in fact, stuck and there was some tracks 
around it. As I approached the vehicle itself, I was very 
careful to observe if anybody had left. When I first arrived I 
couldn't see if there was anybody in the vehicle and so I 
didn't know if somebody had already been stuck and left or 
1 whatever and so I looked around purposely for any tracks 
2 leaving the vehicle and there were none. 
3 Q Were you able to ascertain the condition of the 
4 ground there? 
5 j A It was mud. It was soft. It was easy to leave any 
6 prints there. Anybody walking away would leave imprints. 
7 Q Did you notice any imprints leaving the vehicle in 
8 i any direction? 
9 j •' A There were imprints. You could tell where the driver 
10 had got out, walked to the front, to the back of the vehicle 
11 looking at it. He was stuck. It appeared that he got back in J 
12 the vehicle and then he got back out of the vehicle, walked 
13 around to the passenger side and got into the passenger side. 
14 i Q How stuck was the vehicle? 
15 A That mud is so slick out there. Once you get stuck 
16 in it you have virtually no chance to get out of there without 
17 , a wrecker. 
18 Q So this vehicle couldn't have moved at that point 
19 then? 
20 A No. 
21 • • ;,.,§;•• You said that from up top - and I assume that that 
22 would be the roadway - you couldn't ascertain whether anybody 
23 was in the vehicle; is that correct? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Did you then find anyone in the vehicle when you 
approached the vehicle. 
A Yes. As I approached the vehicle I could see that 
there was a male asleep in the passenger seat behind 
(inaudible). 
Q Did you make contact with that male? 
A I did. 
Q Can you identify him? 
A Yes, I can. 
THE COURT: Do you acknowledge identity? 
MR. BROADHEAD: Yes, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. SEARLE) Did you make physical contact then • 
with the defendant? 
A I did. It took me a while to get him woke up. 
Q Let me step back. When you then - you looked in, you 
observed that there was one occupant in the car, what did you -
any observations at that point? 
A He was the only person in the vehicle and that he was 
asleep or passed out. 
Q So he was asleep at that point? What steps did you 
take then to make contact with him? 
h I opened the door, started trying to awaken the 
subject. It took quite a while for me to awake him. He did 
finally wake up. He come out of the car. He was very 
aggressive. I thought I was going to have to (inaudible) with 
the subject until he finally cleared his mind enough to 
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(inaudible). 
Q So once his mind cleared up he recognized you and 
calmed down? 
A As soon as it finally clicked that I was a law 
enforcement officer and not somebody else (inaudible). 
Q Did you make any physical observations or sensory 
observations concerning the defendant at that time? 
A Yes. I could smell the odor of alcohol emitting from 
his person. Also, he did have red eyes, they were watering but 
this also could have been because he just woke up and so this 
was something that I watched throughout the period to seejif it? 
was imitation of alcohol or just being the fact that he was 
asleep. 
Q You could smell alcohol? 
A I could smell alcohol. 
Q The red eyes could have come from being asleep -
A Correct. 
Q - at six in the morning. When you're trying to 
insure that a person that it's not just sleeping, that is that 
someone is under the influence of alcohol, what steps do you 
taketo try to determine whether they're under the influence of 
alcohol? 
A Well, it's a number of steps that we take and the 
first one is (inaudible) you start looking for any evidence 
saying that the subject has consumed some type of an alcoholic 
beverage. In this case, there was none in the vehicle and none 
in the immediate area. He wouldn't have been able to drink and 
with the tracks being the way they were, say, throw a bottle 
away. 
Q Did you look in the vehicle? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you search under the seats of the vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there any, and I believe the legal term is open 
container, so was there a container which would have held an 
alcoholic beverage, beer can, whatever, in that vehicle? - • * 
A No. 
Q Did you see any in the immediate vicinity? 
A No. 
Q Did you look in the immediate vicinity? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Why did you look in the immediate vicinity? 
A From my experience in working out in that particular 
area, it's not uncommon for people that have wrecked if they 
have been drinking to try to hide the evidence from us as law 
enforcement officers and they'11 shove alcohol cans in the 
bushes, anyplace they possibly can. They'll throw them 
underneath their car or just anything they can possibly do to 
hide the evidence from the law enforcement officers. 
Q Was there any bushes or anything around this vehicle? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Is that commonly termed the salt flats? 
3 : A Yes, the salt flats. 
4 ; Q After making contact with the defendant and him 
5 clearing himself and realizing that you're a law enforcement 
6 ! officer, did you question him as to whether he'd been drinking? 
! 
7 l A Yes, I did. I asked him if he had been drinking. He 
8 : told me he had, in fact, been drinking. 
9 Q Did he tell you what he had been drinking? 
10 ! A At first, let me look at the notes. On the scene he 
11 l said that I had been drinking Southern Comfort and then quickly; 
12 • qualified that with my sister was driving, I wasn't. 
13 Q And what is Southern Comfort, do you know? 
14 \ A Southern Comfort is a whiskey, bourbon. It's a 
15 ; distilled liquor. 
16 | Q After an individual indicates to you that they've 
17 been drinking and you can smell some odor of alcohol do you 
18 i conduct any tests to check for their physical abilities as to 
19 drive a vehicle? 
20 ! A Yes, I do. I do standard field sobriety testing and 
21 < what this is is a method of testing, (inaudible) tasks to see 
22 i if they're in fact capable of safely operating a motor vehicle. 
23 Q Have you been trained in these field sobriety tests? 
24 A Yes, I have. I'm an instructor. 
25 Q I'm sorry. I have this habit of jumping in. I 
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apologize to the Court (inaudible). Are these the field 
sobriety tests that you talked about that you teach? 
A Yes. ' 
Q And you've been conducting these over the 24 years 
that you've been a law enforcement officer? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q How many tests did you conduct with Mr. Henline at 
that point? 
A I attempted to do the entire battery of three tests, 
but because of his condition, he would not do the one leg stand 
for me. He just could not do it. The first of the three that I 
we give in this battery is what we call the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test. Nystagmus is a involuntary jerking of the eye 
which a subject cannot control and this is enhanced greatly by 
the introduction of some drugs or some drug categories. 
Q Now, Trooper, is this thing with the eyes, is this a 
test then where if you have not consumed alcohol, is this a 
test where you move the pen or something, some object in front 
of their eyes? 
A Correct. 
Q And they follow that without moving their head; is 
that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And an individual who hasn't consumed alcohol can 
follow that with their eyes looking as far as they can look 
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without bouncing; is that correct? 
A Let me qualify that. That's correct to a certain 
point. One thing that the Court needs to know is there is one 
percent of the population in the United States that have a 
natural eye - or nystagmus but these people would know it 
immediately and it's an immediate onset. In other words, it's 
not going to go out 20 degrees before it onsets. 
Q So one percent of the population has that? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
A Number 2 is if I move a stimulus quick enough in 
front of anybody's eyes or somebody that's untrained 
(inaudible), you'll actually get a movement of the eye that 
appears to be a nystagmus. One of the qualifications of this 
is that nystagmus has to remain at maximum deviation at prior 
to 45 degrees onset for a minimum of four seconds. This 
illuminates the chances of anything being induced. 
Q Trooper, what is the maximum deviation? 
A Maximum deviation is when the stimuli has been moved 
out to where the corner of the eye is looking as far as it can. 
In other words, you can't see any white in the corner of the 
eye out of this eye when he's looking at the stimulus. 
Q So the person would then be looking out the corner of 
the eye, they're unable to move the eye any more to the right 
or the left? 
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1 : A Correct. 
2 : Q And at that point, a person who hasn't consumed 
3 alcohol or under the influence, 99 percent of the people won't 
4 ! have the bouncing in the eye; is that correct? 
5 ! A Correct. 
€ j Q Did you conduct this test according to how you've 
s • 
7 been trained and how you teach it? -
8 '' A I did. 
t 
9 I . Q Do you receive what are called clues? 
10 J MR. BROADHEAD: Your Honor, may I interrupt real 
11 i quickly? . -• J 
12 I THE COURT: Yes. 
! • . • • • . 
13 ! MR. BROADHEAD: I guess I'm questioning how relevant 
i 
14 J this is. We've already pretty much stipulated the fact that my 
15 : client failed the field sobriety test. For the sake of time, 
16 ! do we need to keep going over them all? 
17 | MR. SEARLE: If we stipulate up to the (inaudible) of 
18 j it then the only issue why we were bringing it up, Your Honor, 
19 ! is that this came approximately 6:30 in the morning where the 
20 i breath alcohol wasn't take until some time later. That's the 
i 
21 ! only reason. If Mr. Broadhead stipulates to it— 
22 | THE COURT: All right. Mr. Broadhead stipulates. 
23 You've had a stipulation and you may consider it as 
24 established so the State has established by the agreement of 
25 the parties that Mr. Henline failed the field sobriety tests. 
20 
1 Q (BY MR. SEARLE) When an individual fails the field 
2 j sobriety test that you conduct, the different tests that you 
3 ! do, what steps do you then take? 
4 I A At that time we'll place him under arrest for driving 
5 ' while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. 
6 ! Q Do you then begin an investigation as to drinking, 
7 i what they drink, when they last drink, those type of things? 
8 = A Yes, we do. We do a vehicle impound and at this 
9 J particular point we have to take possession of the subject 
10 ! vehicle for its safety and we do a .complete inventory of the 
11 | vehicle. Also, we always check the area to make sure that . 1 
12 | there's no evidence in that area and then after we do that, we 
13 call for the wrecker and we take the subject, in where he is 
14 : offered a breath or a (inaudible) sample. In this case it was a 
15 ! (inaudible) sample. 
16 j Q Did you question the defendant as to when he had been 
17 | drinking? 
18 ; A Yes, I did. 
19 i Q And did you receive response to that? 
I 
20 I ' A Yes. After the breath test was over or after he gave 
21 ! some kind of a sample, in this case it was a breath test, we 
i 
22 I read him Miranda and I asked a battery of questions that the 
23 ' State puts on the DUI form which we ask him. 
24 ! Q And is one of those, have you been drinking? 
25 : A Yes. 
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Q And did you receive a response to that question? 
A Yes. 
Q What response did you receive, Trooper? 
A He stated that he had been drinking. 
Q Do you write down their answers as they give it to 
you? 
A I do. 
Q And what answer did you write down? 
A He says, "At the casino, yes." I asked him what he 
had been drinking and he said, "beer and shots of Southern 
Comfort." I asked him how much and he said, "Three to four v * 
double shots." 
Q Did he say where he'd been drinking? 
A Yeah, it was at the casinos, either the Rainbow or 
the Garter. He actually named both of them. 
Q Did you question him as to when he had his last 
drink? 
A I did. You ask them when they had their first drink, 
which he indicated between 9:30 and 10:00 the previous night 
and the last drink he said he had was at 4:30 in the morning. 
Q[ When you talked to (inaudible) you told the jury that 
sometimes people will drink while there sitting there or hide 
things. Is there a question on your form that you ask 
concerning whether the individual has consumed any alcohol 
after a crashed vehicle? 
1 A Yes, in fact the question is "Have you had any 
2 alcoholic beverage or drugs since the crash?" And his answer 
3 was, "No". 
4 Q Trooper, did you subsequently then have Mr. Henline 
5 perform a test, a breath alcohol test? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And I believe it was stipulated too. What results 
8 did you receive off of that? 
9 A The results from his breath test was a .173 percent 
10 at 8:43 in the morning. 
11 Q So .173. What is the legal limit in the State of 
12 Utah? 
13 ; A .08. 
14 ; Q .08. So this is double. However, this comes - you 
15 get to the scene between 6:10 and 6:20. This comes at 8:43? 
16 ' A Correct. 
17 | Q So it's about two hours and 20 minutes approximately 
18 after you first arrived at the scene? 
19
 : A From when I first arrived at the scene. 
20 | Q Through your training over 24 years and continued 
21 | training and teaching, do you learn about what's called burn 
22
 ; off rates or burn off lows? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And what is a burn off rate? 
25 A A burn off rate is the metabolism rate for the body's 
23 
1 process of eliminating any type of a foreign substance from it. 
2 In other words, it's trying to hit (inaudible) which is 
3 everything being equal. The body doesn't like it so it has to -
4 burn this off. The burn off rate on the average person is 
5 .00015 percent per hour. 
6 Q So if an individual had not drank for four hours, 
7 taking just simple math, that would .06 burn off after four 
8 hours? 
9 A Correct. 
10 Q So if I had a .06 in my system, four hours later if 
11 I'm normal, and I may not be the normal person, but four Hours -
12 later I should be back to a .00? 
13 ; A Correct. 
14 : Q Just one other thing, Trooper, do you have video 
15 camera capabilities in your car? 
16 A I do. 
17 Q And do you know how to operate those? 
18 A Yes, I do, 
19 Q And was it operating on this date and time? 
20 A The camera was working fine, my actual lapel mic 
21 wasn't transmitting the way it should so on this particular 
22 tape, outside of the vehicle talking to the subject, you won't 
23 hear anything. When we're inside the vehicle you can hear him 
24 talking. I have a mic inside the vehicle and on my lapel. 
25 Q The video portion however, was it operating properly? 
24 
